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Abstract:
Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-
punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy
punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoﬀs below the non-
cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past pay-
oﬀs determine present contribution capabilities, this could be devastating.
Groups could fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from pun-
ishment altogether. We show that neither is the case generally. By contin-
uously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment
possibilities exhibit increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when
punishment possibilities are absent. Nonetheless, single groups do succumb
to the above-mentioned hazards.
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ity; Poverty-trap; Experiment
JEL: C73; C91; H41
1 Introduction
Cooperation in social-dilemma situations is a central aspect of life on every
scale of human interaction, be it for the purpose of hunting for commonly-
shared food, voting under democratic regimes, or preventing climate change
from making human life impossible on our planet. The critical issue in each
§We would like to thank the research group led by Urs Fischbacher as well as seminar
audiences at the University of Erfurt for their helpful comments. We gratefully acknowl-
edge the ﬁnancial support by the DFG through research grant RO 3071.
of these situations is that, although it is socially beneﬁcial to spend one's
private resources on fostering the common goal, individual maximization of
resources calls for free-riding on others' cooperative eﬀorts (Robyn M. Dawes,
1980). Studying this issue is particularly important in light of the fact that
being involved in a social dilemma is not a once-in-a-life-time experience, but
occurs, in various disguises, on an everyday basis. Often today's contribu-
tion capabilities depend on past behavior. Financial or physical resources
may be low due to past excessive unilateral cooperation. Having taken the
costs of emission reduction in the heating system of one's house reduces the
ﬁnancial capabilities in future social dilemmas. Being hurt after showing
civil courage lowers the future income possibilities during times of recovery.
Ceteris paribus, having been a free-rider in past situations provides a healthy
and ﬁnancially well-equipped starting point for future actions. In the limit,
past providers may not be able to contribute in the future due to excessive
free-riding by others, while free-riders accumulate resources on their private
accounts.
Although there is a considerable literature on cooperation in social dilem-
mas (cf., e.g., the reviews in Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, 2003; or Simon
Gächter and Benedikt Herrmann, 2009), surprisingly little is known about its
dynamic aspects. In this paper, we experimentally study a linear public-good
game in which a subject's provision ability today depends on the subject's
and her group members' behavior in the past. Additionally, we allow for
the possibility of costly peer-to-peer punishment with a convex punishment
technology that is similar to that of Fehr and Gächter (2002) for low values
of assigned punishment points.1 The distinctive feature of our design is the
endogeneity of players' contribution capabilities. Instead of providing sub-
jects with (new) endowments in every round they play, they receive an initial
endowment on their wealth account and subsequently play with whatever is
currently on that account. Consequently, their payoﬀ does not consist of the
1In introducing a convex punishment technology, we follow the example of studies
like Fehr and Gächter (2000); Laurent Denant-Boemont, David Masclet, and Charles
Noussair (2007); or Nikos Nikiforakis (2008). Convex punishment technologies have also
been used in other areas of economic research such as the law-and-economics literature,
e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala and Nuno Garoupa (2004).
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sum of period payoﬀs, but it is given by the ﬁnal amount on their wealth
account.2
The structure of the game has a number of interesting implications. First
of all, it puts all the weight on the long run, which is another feature that
sets us apart from earlier studies of dynamic elements in the provision of
public goods. Notably, this leads to incentives for cooperation even in the
absence of a punishment mechanism if at least a fraction of the players is
motivated by social considerations. On the other hand, the introduction
of a punishment mechanism could have devastating eﬀects if future contri-
bution capabilities are determined by present behavior, especially because
early punishment has been shown to be particularly strong in experimental
studies of peer-punishment mechanisms (cf., e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000;
Özgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Bettina Rockenbach, 2006; or Mar-
tin Sefton, Robert Shupp and James Walker, 2007). Alternatively, potential
punishers, being aware of this hazard, might refrain from sanctioning other
group-members. As a consequence, play in the game with and without the
punishment mechanism might not diﬀer.
We ﬁnd that players do punish, leading to an initial disadvantage of
groups with a punishment possibilities as compared to groups that do not
dispose of such possibilities. However, groups with punishment possibilities
are able to keep players' contributed fractions of their current wealth at
a constant level, whereas in the sanction-free environment, these fractions
exhibit the typical declining trend. Interestingly, we do not observe any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the absolute level of public-good contributions at
any point in time, which marks a stark contrast to earlier studies of public-
good provision.3 However, with punishment levels falling over time, wealth
levels in the groups having punishment opportunities are able to catch up
with those in the groups without. In contrast to the latter, average wealth
2An interesting related study is that of Edward Buckley and Rachel Croson (2006) who
analyse the eﬀect of information about the group members' accumulated wealth levels
on contribution decisions as well as the eﬀect of diﬀerent endowments. In their study,
neither diﬀerent endowments nor heterogeneity in accumulated wealth leads to diﬀerences
in subjects' contributions.
3Cf., e.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000); or Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl (2009) for a
game with heterogeneous endowments.
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levels in the former exhibit an increasing growth path, such that signiﬁcantly
higher wealth and, consequently, contribution levels seem to be a question of
an extension of the time horizon by a small number of rounds.
Having discussed the distinctive features of our study, their potential im-
plications, and our main results, let us review the related literature. There
is a substantial theoretic literature on repeated social-dilemma games with
earlier play inﬂuencing later distributions of diﬀerent (player) types in evo-
lutionary settings.4 However, to the best of our knowledge, experimental
studies focusing on dynamics in social dilemmas are surprisingly limited.
Noussair and Cindy Soo (2008) study public-good provision when the group's
past cooperation level inﬂuences each member's current marginal per-capita
return of provision. This resembles a situation in which players' abilities to
contribute to a public good is unrelated to the payoﬀ stemming from it, but
the more cooperative the group has been in the past the higher is the re-
turn from future cooperation. In their setting, contribution levels generally
do not exhibit the usual falling trend except for a minority of the groups.
Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Harrie A. A. Verbon (2006) consider a situation in
which a group member's beneﬁt from the public good depends on the player's
current wealth. This setup is well-tailored to their focus on inequality and
situations prone to the accentuation of this inequality. Their ﬁndings are
surprising in that subjects' propensity to cooperate is not aﬀected by the
degree of inequality induced. In contrast, in a control treatment that does
not involve a dynamic component, induced inequality has a positive eﬀect
on cooperation. They conclude that subjects' fairness concerns seem to be
`crowded out' by the introduction of the dynamics. Finally, Gächter, Stefan
Grosse, and Rockenbach (2009) study dynamic public-good provision in a
setting in which the players' endowment in period t is determined by the
player's payoﬀ in period t-1. In contrast to our study, however, ﬁnal payoﬀs
are still given by the sum of all period payoﬀs. Unlike in the study of Nous-
4For examples of the evolutionary settings, cf. e.g. Peter J. Richerson and Robert
Boyd (2005) and the many references cited therein. For a game-theoretic treatment of a
diﬀerential-game dynamic public good, see Chaim Fershtman and Shmuel Nitzan (1991).
Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry (1991) analyse a two-player step-level public good with
alternating contribution stages.
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sair and Soo (2008), groups in the main treatment of the study by Gächter
et al. (2009) tend to do worse than those in any of their `non-dynamic' con-
trol treatments. In particular, this holds for groups in which the endowment
history was induced corresponding to the history of a randomly chosen `twin
group' in the main treatment. This latter ﬁnding seems to be in line with
the earlier ﬁndings of Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) reported above.
In the remainder of this introduction, let us shortly present the structure
of our paper. We introduce the game-theoretic model underlying our exper-
imental setting in section 2. We will lay out the standard game-theoretic
solution to the game and point to a number of notable diﬀerences of our
dynamic setting to the usual static setting, where dynamic and static are
meant to refer to endogenous and exogenous endowment determination, re-
spectively. We will further discuss the eﬀects social preferences would have
on our predictions. Finally, we will use two benchmark scenarios as our re-
search hypotheses to span the range of possible outcomes. In section 3, we
present the experimental procedure and design, followed by the presentation
of our results in section 4. Section 5, ﬁnally, winds up with a discussion of
our ﬁndings and a pointer to the relevance of our benchmark scenarios.
2 Game-theoretic model
For our investigation, we implement two diﬀerent games, the dynPUN game
and the dynNOpun game. Both games are dynamic games consisting of T
rounds. In each round a public-good game is played. The games diﬀer from
a supergame with T repetitions of the stage games by two important aspects:
(i) contribution capabilities depend on earlier play, and (ii) no roundly payoﬀs
are paid. Instead, game payoﬀs are determined by the ﬁnal-round wealth-
levels only.5
In the dynNOpun game, each round t, t = 1, ..., T , has exactly one stage
in which a standard public-good game with n players is played. In the ﬁrst
5This is an important diﬀerence to the study by Gächter et al. (2009), who implement
(i) but not (ii). In their setup, roundly payoﬀs are paid as well as determining next-round
endowments.
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round, each player is endowed with an identical amount of E tokens. The
contribution capability, or current wealth, of a subsequent round t, Eti , cor-
responds to player i's last round's wealth Ωt−1i plus a `recovery surplus' of
m. In every round, each player i may contribute xti tokens from her current
wealth to a common project and keeps the remainder on a private account.
The total contributions are multiplied by nµ and divided evenly amongst the
players in the group, so that the public good exhibits a constant marginal
per-capita return of µ. Thus, player i's wealth Ωti at the end of round t is:
Ωti = E
t
i − xti + µΣjxtj, t = 1, ..., T
with E1i = E.
In the dynPUN game, a second stage is added. After the ﬁrst stage, which
is identical to that of the dynNOpun game, players are informed about all
players' contribution decisions and may then assign punishment points to the
other players in their group. By assigning ptij points to player j, player i can
reduce the round-t wealth of player j by ptij. Punishment is not only costly
for the punished, but also for the punisher. The assignment of ptij points
inﬂicts costs of c(ptij) on player i. The cost function is a convex function that
is positive for all positive values of ptij and monotonically increasing. We
set two further constraints on punishment: players cannot assign values of
ptij that would drive their own current account below zero, and they cannot
drive other players' current account at the end of the round below zero. If
they assign more points than necessary to eliminate another player's positive
earnings, they nevertheless have to bear the full costs of their choice.
The resulting function determining player i's current wealth Ωti at the end
of round t is:
Ωti = E
t
i − xti + µΣjxtj − h(Σjptji)−Σjc(ptij), t = 1, ..., T
with Σjc(ptij) ≤ Eti − xti + µΣjxtj
h(Σjp
t
ji) = min{Eti − xti + µΣjxtj, Σjptji},
and E1i = E.
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The next round's contribution capabilities are given by Eti = Ω
t−1
i + m,
where m is a small increment meant to reﬂect a player's natural regeneration
capabilities and Ω0i ≡ E,∀i.
2.1 Standard game-theoretic solution
The standard game-theoretic subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria of both games
for rational selﬁsh actors are obvious and equal to those of the correspond-
ing `static' supergames (i.e., for Eti that are independent of the contribution
vector xt−1, and more often than not, invariant over time or even over play-
ers), following directly from the typical backward-induction argument. In
other words, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, no player will make pos-
itive contributions, nor punish other players in case of the dynPUN game.
However, there is one notable diﬀerence between the games presented here
and their respective `static' counterparts: in our games, xti = 0, ∀i, t, is no
longer a dominant strategy. To illustrate the intuition behind this, con-
sider a simple example of three players with an initial endowment of E and
no between-round regeneration, such that the contribution capabilities in a
given round t′, t′ > 1, equal the wealth level at the end of the preceding
round (Ω0 = E,m = 0, µ = 0.5, and n = 3). Consider player i and suppose
that all other players j choose full contributions and no punishment, i.e.,
xtj = E
t
j and p
.
j. = 0,∀j 6= i. No matter what the punishment technology
is, a rational selﬁsh player i will always set p.i. = 0.
6 A player i who always
sets xti = 0 would obtain Ω
T
i = E + T (2E/2) = (1 + T )E. In contrast, if
she chooses xti = E
t
i , t = 1, ..., T − 1, and xTi = 0, she obtains a payoﬀ of
ΩTi = 2(3/2)
T−1E. It is easy to see that the second strategy will lead to
higher payoﬀs for large enough T 's. In our simple example, two rounds are
enough for the latter strategy to `break even', while for T = 3, it already
leads to a payoﬀ of 4.5E instead of 4E. Of course, this is not to suggest
that the strategy presented would be the best-response to all other players
6We are abstracting from punishment technologies that convey a beneﬁt to the punisher,
rather than causing costs. In most societies, punishment technologies that do not follow
this assumption are ruled out, probably in order to avoid misadministration of punishment
driven by selﬁsh motives to the largest possible extent.
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contributing fully for all parameter combinations. In our exemplary case, a
strategy starting to defect in the penultimate period would obtain the same
payoﬀ as the one defecting only in the ﬁnal period. For the parameters used
in our experiment, it would do even better. Note that, up to this point, we
have neglected the possibility of positive punishment decisions, as well as of
reactions to defecting behavior by the other players. The sole purpose of
our example was to point out that the dynamics provide incentives to coop-
eration even for players maximizing only their own material payoﬀ in case
other players do not conform to the model assumptions of being rational and
selﬁsh. The reason for the non-dominance of free-riding is that it conveys
players the power to increase others' later-round contribution capabilities
through their own contributions in early rounds.
2.2 Solution with social preferences
How does the solution of the game change if one assumes that subjects have
some kind of social preferences? For some guidance on what the answer
to this question would look like, we discuss some arguments based on one
of the most prominent and tractable social preference models, proposed by
Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). They show that in a standard linear
public-good game, equilibria with positive contributions are possible if one
assumes the existence of inequality-averse players. In these equilibria, a
subset of conditionally cooperative players contribute a positive amount
to the public good while the remaining players refrain from contributing.
These equilibria exist as long as the contributors do not suﬀer too much
from disadvantageous inequality. If punishment is possible on a second stage,
there may be equilibria in which all players contribute positive amounts to
the public good. These equilibria require a suﬃcient number of conditionally
cooperative enforcers who highly dislike disadvantageous inequality. These
enforcers are not only willing to contribute to the public good but also ready
to credibly threaten purely money-maximizing players with punishment if the
latter do not contribute.
What does inequality-aversion imply for our dynamic game? Rather than
8
conducting a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic game with socially con-
cerned players, we provide an idea of the direction in which the existence of
inequality-averse players changes the `standard' predictions. Game payoﬀs
correspond to the wealth levels at the end of the ﬁnal period. For a one-shot
four-player game with a marginal per-capita return as used in our treatments
and without punishment opportunities, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that
there is no equilibrium with positive contribution levels unless all players are
conditionally cooperative. They go on to point out that, under inequality-
aversion parameters as typically observed in economic experiments, the latter
is very unlikely to happen.7 In our dynNOpun game, omni-lateral free-riding
is the unique equilibrium in the ﬁnal stage of the game if there is at least one
money-maximizing player and the money-maximizing players' ﬁnal-period
contribution capability is not lower than the conditional-cooperators' one.
In this case, a backward-induction argument leads to the conclusion that
there cannot be positive contributions in any round. Hence, the standard
equilibrium from the `static case', in which no player ever contributes, also
exists in our game. Furthermore, following from the same reasoning as in
the one-shot game, there exists a second class of equilibria with completely
symmetric contributions amongst a group of conditional cooperators who
disregard potentially lower contribution levels by money-maximizing play-
ers. However, in our setting, this only applies for groups consisting only of
conditional cooperators.8
Still, for the dynNOpun game, there is yet another class of equilibrium
that may sound counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight. In these equilibria, money-
maximizing players start out contributing their full endowment, while con-
ditional cooperators abstain from contributing positive amounts in the ﬁrst
round. In following rounds, money-maximizers keep contributing their cur-
rent wealth, while conditional cooperators mirror the formers' action from the
7The parameter distribution suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) results in that the
chances for cooperation amount to 2.56% in a typical public-good game (n = 4, µ =
0.5). The parameter distribution estimated by Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, and
Hans-Theo Normann (2008) would lead to a similar conclusion.
8The condition for this class of equilibria to exist is obviously the same as spelt out by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the one-shot game.
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respective preceding round. Only in the ﬁnal periods do money-maximizing
players free-ride completely, while conditional cooperators choose their con-
tributions as to equalize payoﬀs with the money-maximizers.9
To understand the intuition behind this class of equilibria, consider again
the ﬁnal stage of the game. If conditional cooperators have higher ﬁnal-period
contribution-capabilities than money-maximizers, the former will contribute
part of their current wealth to close the `wealth gap', while the latter will
obviously free-ride. In the preceding section we have pointed out that in
dynNOpun, a payoﬀ-maximizing player may have an incentive to contribute
positive amounts to the public good even in the absence of any inequality
concerns  given the assumption that other players will continue to contribute
after the money-maximizer's defection. In other words, it may be proﬁtable
for these players to make the pie bigger and free-ride only in the ﬁnal rounds.
By mirroring the money-maximizers' contributions from the respective pre-
ceding round, conditional cooperators always choose the amount necessary to
equalize wealth levels if all money-maximizers free-rode in the corresponding
period. A thorough analysis of the proposed equilibrium is given in appendix
B. Interestingly enough, these equilibria require conditions that are rather
likely to be met, in stark contrast to those needed for cooperation in the one-
shot game analyzed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).10 In other words, unlike in
the `static' game the existence of inequality concerns could often lead to a
high degree of cooperation.11
9In fact, this class of equilibria is more general than proposed here. Money-maximizers'
equilibrium strategy could prescribe to contribute any arbitrary fraction of their wealth, as
long as it is symmetric, and to stop contributing in period T−t′. The conditionally cooper-
ative players would mirror money-maximizers' contributions in the respective subsequent
period and refrain from contributing positive amounts in all periods t > T−t′+1. However,
the most eﬃcient of these equilibria is the one with full money-maximizer contributions
and t′ = 1. Hence, this equilibrium would be chosen by the same equilibrium reﬁnement
argument Fehr and Schmidt (1999) employ to choose the full-contribution equilibrium.
10For the parameters used in our experiment, the likelihood of the preconditions for
this equilibrium to be given amounts to roughly 35%, according to the type distribution
suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
11In the absence of common knowledge of other players' types, this class of equilibria may
vanish: selﬁsh types could mimic the equilibrium strategy of the conditional cooperators,
pretending to be one of them. However, if reciprocation in the ﬁnal round is rather
doubtful, incentives for contributions by other selﬁsh types are diluted. However, theoretic
analyses of games using Fehr-Schmidt-type preferences usually assume common knowledge
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For a public-good game with punishment opportunities, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) show that equilibria exist in which all players contribute
to the public good, given that at least some players have social preferences.
In particular, they contend that the `good' equilibrium stipulating full con-
tributions by all players would be chosen by a reasonable reﬁnement ar-
gument.12 The prospects for such equilibria depend on the existence and
the number of conditionally cooperative enforcers, the magnitude of their
inequality preferences and the power of the punishment technology. In static
public-good games with relatively small groups as used in most experimental
studies (n = 4) and with a 1:3 punishment technology, the probability of a
cooperative equilibrium is about eight times as high as in the game without
punishment opportunities.13
Would we expect a similar eﬀect for our treatments? The answer is no,
for a number of reasons. First, as has been pointed out above, the prospects
of a cooperative equilibrium in our dynNOpun game are not as low as in
the corresponding `static' game. Therefore, the increase in the probability
of a cooperative outcome resulting from the introduction of a punishment
mechanism will be far more moderate. Second, consider the ﬁnal subgame.
In case of very large wealth diﬀerences, an enforcer may no longer have an
incentive or not be able to punish as much as would be required to equalize
ﬁnal payoﬀs due to our convex punishment technology. In fact, as can be
easily shown, the optimal punishment choice of a player only depends on
the total number of players, the number of enforcers, and her aversion to
inequality, but not on the size of the inequality (unless this inequality is
small, in which case a corner solution may result). Hence, the enforceable
ﬁnal-period contribution level is bounded from above. In contrast to the
games most often played in the laboratory, this upper bound will tend to be
of types (most notably, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, themselves). Rather than by its accuracy,
this assumption has been justiﬁed by its predictive power. In light of this fact, we follow
their example by making the assumption.
12Both p.842.
13For the preference distribution suggested by Fehr and Schmidt, the probability for
cooperation in a static public-good game amounts to about 20% (with n = 4, µ = 0.4,
and a cost-to-punishment ratio of 1:3).
11
given by enforcer preferences rather than by players' wealth.14
On the other hand, for the class of positive-contribution equilibria in the
dynNOpun game described above, the `equivalent' for the dynPUN game
will display higher contribution levels, for two reasons: (i) payoﬀ-maximizers
can be forced to contribute a certain level even in the ﬁnal period, and (ii)
the threat of (partial) non-reciprocation in the ﬁnal period leading payoﬀ-
maximizers to contribute earlier on can partially be substituted for by the
threat of sanction assignment. Thereby, the conditional cooperators are able
to increase their own contributions in earlier periods beyond what is neces-
sary to equalize payoﬀs for the case of defecting money-maximizers, in turn
increasing the overall ﬁnal wealth level.
In summary, in the presence of social preferences the introduction of pun-
ishment opportunities enhances both the prospects of a cooperative outcome
and the size of contributions in the `static' public-good games commonly
used in the literature. In contrast, in our dynamic version of the game, the
social-preference model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) would pre-
dict a substantial diﬀerence only in the achieved contribution levels, while
the predicted diﬀerence in the probability of an outcome with non-negligible
cooperation rates tends to be rather small.
2.3 Research hypotheses
We have seen in the preceding game-theoretic analysis that in the presence
of players motivated by social considerations, a dynamic public-good game
with endogenously evolving contribution capabilities provides incentives for
14For the parameters used in our game in conjunction with the parameters suggested
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the largest possible optimal number of assigned points is
15.4 per punishing player for 3 enforcers, and 5.8 points per enforcing player for two
such players. If there is a single enforcer, there will not be any point assignment, as
the marginal costs of punishment (equal to 1/3 at 0 punishment points) are higher than
the `enforcer's' marginal beneﬁt from punishment. Note, for comparison, that the average
ﬁnal-round contribution-capability level amounts to over 2000 tokens. For the derivation of
the optimal choice of punishment points, the interested reader is referred to the calculations
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as a reproduction of their calculations would not provide any
new insights. The only diﬀerence between their case and ours is that the costs are no
longer linear, and thus, we do not (necessarily) obtain a corner solution.
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cooperation. In the `static' case, punishment leads to an increase in both
the level of contributions and the prospects of a cooperative outcome, while
in our game, only the former is expected. However, these are equilibrium
considerations that rely on a considerable number of assumptions. Notably,
they presume that there will not be any punishment actions, as the pun-
ishment threat is credible and suﬃcient to deter deviations from the pre-
scribed contribution levels. From the vast amount of experimental evidence
on public-good games with punishment we know that these conditions are
fulﬁlled hardly ever.15 While the threat of sanctions is generally credible in
the sense that subjects do assign punishment points, it is often not credible
and suﬃcient enough to induce high contributions early on in the experi-
ment. At the same time, the eﬃciency costs of punishment are often so high
that the average period payoﬀ is reduced below the no-contribution equi-
librium level in early rounds. In a game in which contribution capabilities
do not depend on earlier play, this characteristic often does not have an
enduring eﬀect, as stable or growing contribution levels insure that ﬁnal 
and often total  earnings surpass those from the comparable game without
sanctions.16 In a game with endogenously evolving contribution capabilities,
however, a conditionally cooperative enforcer has to strike a balance in the
following trade-oﬀ: punishing a low-contributing player may induce higher
future cooperation levels, but at the same time, it destroys parts of the future
contribution capabilities of both the punisher and the punished player. This
tension provides the base for two extreme benchmark scenarios that we will
use as our research hypotheses.
The ﬁrst scenario pictures that a group falls prey to a `poverty-trap' due
to excessive punishment. Punishers put too much weight on the cooperation-
enhancing eﬀect of punishment, neglecting its costs. Heavy punishment in
early rounds - as often reported in static settings - will not only decrease
15For an overview, cf., e.g., Gächter and Herrmann (2009).
16Cf., e.g., Nikiforakis and Normann (2008). A notable exception is to be found in the
study by Gächter, Elke Renner, and Sefton (2008) for the groups playing over 10 rounds;
in their case, average earnings in the punishment treatment never reach those from the
punishment-free institution, and in all but two rounds, average earnings are below the
benchmark set by omnilateral defection.
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round-wise eﬃciency but will have serious repercussions on subsequent con-
tribution capabilities and thus, achievable wealth levels in subsequent rounds.
In other words, even if punishment leads to higher contributed fractions of
current wealth (as it usually does), if it keeps wealth levels down, contribu-
tions will still be lower. Furthermore, even in the case of growing wealth
levels, punishment will not necessarily lead to higher contributions in the
long run; if the initial disadvantage is large enough, catching up with non-
punishing societies may take a very long time  potentially longer than our
experimental sessions.17 At the same time, catching up may be diﬃcult for
another reason: enforcers will need to uphold the punishment threat, unless
groups entirely consist of conditional cooperators. With rising wealth and
envisioned relative contributions that are at least stable, assigned points will
need to be higher to do their job. Simultaneously, our convex punishment
technology makes higher penalties disproportionately more expensive. How-
ever, relatively ineﬃcient punishment will not be able to uphold contributions
the same way more eﬃcient cost-to-eﬀect ratios do, which may in turn induce
contributions to fall again even in the presence of an initially successful pun-
ishment mechanism (see e.g., the results of Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008,
on diﬀerent cost-to-eﬀect ratios).
H 1. Groups in dynPUN fall prey to a poverty trap, i.e., punishment actions
diminish future contribution capabilities such that contributions remain be-
low those in the dynNOpun treatment, while relative contributions (measured
against players' current wealth) may or may not be higher. Consequently,
payoﬀs will be lower in the treatment with punishment opportunities.
If, on the other hand, players foresee the detrimental eﬀects harsh punish-
ment in early periods may have, they may refrain from contribution enforce-
ment, which may render the punishing mechanism ineﬀective. Alternatively,
17Cf. Gächter et al. (2008); given we only have subjects play over 20 rounds, their
diﬀerent results for large numbers of repetitions may not apply. At the same time, the
number of rounds used in the present study is substantially higher than in other studies
for which a beneﬁcial eﬀect of punishment has been documented, such as most treatments
in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008; note that their 1:2 punishment technology only leads
to a non-signiﬁcant increase in cumulative earnings).
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punishment may not even be needed, given the increased incentives for coop-
eration provided by a combination of social preferences and dynamic incen-
tives. In this case, punishment opportunities would not lead to a cooperation-
enhancing eﬀect, either, but this time as a consequence of groups without
punishment performing too well. Taking together the expected eﬀects of dy-
namics fostering aggregate payoﬀs in a non-punishing world and of impeding
the positive eﬀects of punishment in a world where the latter is an option, we
propose the following competing hypothesis on contribution and punishment
behavior:
H 2. Players in dynPUN abstain from contribution enforcement in order to
save the group's resources. In consequence, the cooperation-enhancing eﬀect
of punishment vanishes. Therefore, contributions in absolute and relative
terms are non-distinguishable between the treatments, as are payoﬀs.
An important feature of our study is that the game structure inherently
leads to asymmetric wealth levels, unless all players cooperate to exactly
the same degree. A widely-received feature of public-good studies with het-
erogeneous endowments is that rich participants typically contribute less in
relative terms than poor participants do.18 For our study, we expect this
to hold in heterogeneous but not in homogeneous groups: in case there are
(partial) free-riders as well as full-contributors, the assertion will hold true au-
tomatically, and if players have the often-assumed types  pure cooperators,
defectors, and punishers  it will also be a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. In con-
trast, in groups exclusively composed of either free-riders or full-contributors,
we will not be able to make a statement of that kind. A comparison across
groups, on the other hand, will most likely yield mixed results, given the rich
will be a mixture of free-riders from mixed groups and full-contributors in
more homogeneous groups. In other words, we expect to be forced to qualify
the above assertion as a consequence of the endogeneity of subjects' (rela-
tive) wealth levels.19 This is an important diﬀerence to the setting of Sadrieh
18M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden (2007, p. 812). For
a study on heterogeneous punishment technologies, see Nikiforakis, Normann, and Brian
Wallace (forthcoming).
19Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll, and Jason F. Shogren (2005) examine a diﬀerent kind
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and Verbon (2006) who induce wealth heterogeneity exogenously. While they
ﬁnd that [a]pparently, the poor do not blame the rich for their own poverty,
this cannot be expected in our game.20 In our setting, the poor cannot but
blame the rich for their low level of wealth, as the latter are richer than the
former because of the previous decisions taken.
A second ﬁnding from a number of studies of a linear public-good tech-
nology employing heterogeneous wealth or endowment levels is that aver-
age contributions are lower than under homogeneous ones (see e.g., Lisa R.
Anderson, Jennifer M. Mellor, and Jeﬀrey Milyo, 2007; Cherry, Kroll, and
Shogren, 2005, or the literature surveyed in Kenneth S. Chan et al., 1999).21
For our study, we do not expect clear evidence in this regard because of the
reasons outlined above: homogeneity will be high both in very wealthy and
very poor societies, while it will take on intermediate values in those groups
in between.
3 Experimental design and procedure
In our experiment, we implemented the games described in section II, with
the following parameter values: n = 4 subjects interacted within a ﬁxed
group over T = 20 rounds. The initial endowment was deﬁned by Ω0 = 18,
and m = 2, such that E1i = 20, ∀i. The public good's marginal per-capita
return was set to µ = 0.4, and punishment costs were calculated according
to the following formula:
c(pij) =
1
3
pij +
p3ij
2000
. (1)
This formula was chosen such as to preserve the standard cost-to-punishment
ratio of 1:3 for low values of punishment points, but to reﬂect the increas-
of endogenous wealth asymmetry, having subjects earn their endowments for a one-shot
public-good game to test whether the origin of endowments leads to diﬀerences in behavior.
20Sadrieh and Verbon (2006, p. 1219).
21For other public-good technologies, diﬀerent results obtain, as in the case of Sadrieh
and Verbon (2006). For a more detailed review, cf. Chan et al. (1999), or Levati et al.
(2007).
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ing diﬃculties real-life punishers would be expected to be faced with when
setting out to destroy larger amounts of wealth. After observing others' con-
tributions, subjects in the dynPUN treatment were asked to indicate the
players they wanted to assign points to or to indicate that they did not want
to assign points to any other player before being allowed to punish those
players indicated. This was done for two reasons: (i) to avoid a punishment-
related experimenter-demand eﬀect as much as possible, and (ii) to ensure
consistency with our econometric procedure of separating the decisions on
whether to punish and on how many points to assign.
Our experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and run at
the Laboratory for Experimental Economics (eLab) at University of Erfurt.
We ran 4 sessions, 2 for each of our treatments. A total of 72 subjects
were recruited using ORSEE (Ben Greiner, 2004). In each session, subjects
were welcomed and asked to draw lots, in order to assign each of them to a
cabin. Once all subjects were seated, the instructions were handed to them
in written form before being read aloud by the experimenter. After this,
subjects were given the opportunity to go over the instructions again and
ask any questions they might have. Questions were answered individually.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was assigned an identi-
ﬁcation letter (R, S, T, or U) that was kept constant over the course of the
experiment. Assignment to groups was random and groups did not change
during the entire session. In each session, there were either 4 or 5 matching
groups, so that we obtained 9 independent observations for each treatment.
Subjects were paid according to their individual performance according
to the following formula:
Payment in Euros = (Number of experimental tokens accumulated)2/7
This translated into possible payments between 0 and 40 Euros. The sessions
lasted approximately three quarters of an hour, average payments being 8.30
Euros. Payments were settled individually to ensure players' anonymity.
Also, no other information was given to the subjects that would enable them
to connect the players in the game with the respective subjects in the session.
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4 Results
As a ﬁrst indicator for the performance in the two treatments, we focus on
the average wealth levels. Figure 1a shows that they increase monotonically
in both treatments. While wealth levels are (weakly) signiﬁcantly lower in
dynPUN in the ﬁrst (second) quarter of the experiment, they are not statis-
tically diﬀerent afterwards (p-values by quarters are 0.0142, 0.0939, 0.2581,
and 0.7304).22
Result 1. In an environment where contribution capabilities are determined
by past contribution levels, groups under a peer-punishment mechanism suﬀer
an initial disadvantage in terms of their wealth level, compared to groups in a
treatment without punishment opportunities. This diﬀerence is made up for
by the second half of the experiment.
Figure 1: a) Average wealth levels from both treatments (left), and b) and
average growth rates of wealth (right).
22Treatment comparisons are always made by means of two-sided Mann-Whitney U
tests.
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In other words, groups in the dynPUN treatment manage to overcome an
initial disadvantage, but they do not surpass the groups from the dynNOpun
treatment. In relation to the potentially achievable wealth level, our subjects
only obtain 1.14% (0.48%) in dynPUN (dynNOpun). Figure 1b, displaying
average wealth-level growth rates, illustrates the history leading to these low
percentages. Out of the theoretically possible benchmark of 60% growth,
average growth rates do not reach even half. Having said that, we notice
two very distinct growth paths in our treatments. While the average growth
rate is signiﬁcantly higher in dynNOpun in the ﬁrst quarter (p = 0.0315),
it declines almost monotonically from 26% to 6%. The growth rate in the
dynPUN treatment keeps rising from a mere 5% to just over 20% in round
18, before the end-game eﬀect kicks in for the ﬁnal two rounds. However, the
diﬀerence in growth rates in favor of the dynPUN treatment after period 11
does not reach statistical signiﬁcance before the end of the experiment.23
To obtain a better understanding of how these (non-)diﬀerences in wealth
levels and growth rates come about, let us turn to subjects' contribution de-
cisions. Surprisingly, and contrary to the ﬁndings from previous research on
peer-punishment in public-good games, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant treatment
diﬀerences in terms of contributions in any of the 20 rounds.24
Result 2. In an environment where contribution capabilities are determined
by past contribution levels, a peer-punishment mechanism does not increase
contribution levels beyond those in a punishment-free environment.
However, if we look at what subjects contribute as a part of their cur-
rent capability, which we will refer to as relative contribution, we observe
the well-known pattern of initially similar but diverging contribution paths.
We illustrate this pattern in Figure 2. In dynNOpun, average relative con-
tributions start out at 43%, falling over time in what is almost a monotonic
fashion to 17% in round 18, while they slightly increase from 37% to 41% dur-
ing the same time period in dynPUN.25 The treatment diﬀerence in relative
23p-values for quarters 2-4 are p6−10 = 0.9314, p11−15 = 0.5457, and p16−18 =
0.2973(p16−20 = 0.3401).
24Apart from the ﬁnal round (p = 0.1217), p-values are always above 0.25.
25A spearman correlation test between the average relative contribution and time over
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contributions is not signiﬁcant but for the ﬁnal quarter (p16−20 = 0.0503),
even though the dynPUN average already surpasses the one in dynPUN as
early as in the third period.
Result 3. Contributed fractions of current wealth do not fall over time in
the presence of a peer-punishment mechanism, while they exhibit the typical
declining trend in its absence. The diﬀerence in relative contributions is
signiﬁcant at the end of the experiment.
Figure 2: Treatment averages over contribution levels relative to current
capabilities.
Still, the question remains of why this advantage does not translate into
higher contributions within the time frame set by our design. Naturally, the
answer has to be in the resources destroyed by punishment.
In Figure 3a, we depict the average fraction of public-good surplus de-
stroyed by punishment actions (i.e., the sum of the punishers' costs and
punished players' losses). As can be seen from the ﬁgure, more than half of
a group's surplus is eaten up by punishment actions especially in the ﬁrst
half of the experiment. Overall, an average of 62% of the groups' growth
the whole experiment has a p-value of 0.0612.
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is lost. The fact that this problem is even more pronounced in the be-
ginning of the experiment can account for the humble performance of the
average dynPUN group and its diﬃculty to outperform the average group in
the dynNOpun treatment: as stated before, it leads to a signiﬁcantly worse
early-round performance of groups in dynPUN. This creates a disadvantage
that is aggravated by the power-function character of our payoﬀ function as
`production capacities' are determined by past performance.
Result 4. On average, the use of punishment destroys 62% of a group's gains
from cooperation, thereby explaining the uncommonly low level of contribu-
tions when compared to the punishment-free environment.
Figure 3: a) Average fraction of public-good surplus destroyed by punish-
ment actions; b) Average fraction of punished players' surplus destroyed,
(i.e., conditional on the players being punished).
Another question concerns the impact such punishment has on the indi-
vidual player, most importantly, how strongly received punishment aﬀects
a punished player's wealth. We depict this in Figure 3b, showing that on
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Table 1: Punishment statistics from the four punishment treatments from
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), and from our dynPUN treatment. The
ratio of 1:2.8 given for our treatment refers to the average eﬀective ratio in
our experiment.
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) Our data
Technology 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 ∗1 : 2.8∗
Fraction of wealth
destroyed
0.0935 0.1141 0.1154 0.0653 0.0919
PunRcvd/(wealth after the
public-good stage)
0.0391 0.0714 0.0807 0.0482 0.0636
...cond. on receiving
punishment
0.1204 0.1880 0.2257 0.3271 0.1304
Number of punishment
assignments
0.4500 0.5208 0.4458 0.2708 0.7194
...cond. on this number
being positive
1.3118 1.5122 1.4850 1.2490 1.4362
punExp/(wealth after the
public-good stage)
0.0543 0.0427 0.0346 0.0171 0.0254
...cond. on punmt expenses
being positive
0.1444 0.1216 0.0982 0.0677 0.0474
average, punished players are left with more than their wealth at the begin-
ning of the round. Only in two rounds out of twenty do these players lose
(slightly) more due to reduction points than what they have gained from the
public good before the punishment stage. What does not happen, on aver-
age, is that punished players' wealth is brought to shrink. One reading of
this ﬁnding is that punishers take care not to waste too many resources for
future group production. To obtain a clearer picture of whether punishment
is meted out in a more cautionary way than usual, we compare our data to
data from a `static' experiment comparing diﬀerent linear punishment tech-
nologies that was conducted by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008). Knowing
that the ﬁgures calculated from these two diﬀerent data sets can at best give
us an indication of the main trends, we compare them in table 1.
From Table 1 we see most indicators are rather similar between the two
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experiments, despite the diﬀerences in the experimental setup. A notable
diﬀerence is that punishment expenses and points received conditional on
punishment meted out/received tend to be on the lower end of the distribu-
tion in our experiment, but more strikingly, that the number of punishment
actions is substantially higher. In light of the fact that this number is not
diﬀerent when conditioned on punishment being eﬀected, in our experiment,
more players seem to take a share in sanctioning misbehavior. In other
words, while those who punish tend to assign less points than under the lin-
ear technologies employed in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), more players
are engaged, leading to a similar impact on punished players' wealth levels.
Result 5. Compared to data from `static' environments with comparable cost-
to-sanction ratios, subjects in our punishment environment seem to punish
more often but more moderately.
To understand how such frequent but moderate punishment impacts on
contribution behavior, we conduct a number of Wilcoxon tests. The most
striking result is that the likelihood of an increase in (relative) contributions
after a player experiences sanctions is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
case when the player is not punished (p = 0.2031 for contributions, p =
0.1641 for relative contributions).26 Furthermore, the size of the change in
contributions from one period to the next conditional on being punished is not
signiﬁcantly higher, either (p = 0.1386). Only the size of relative contribution
changes is signiﬁcantly larger after experienced punishment (p = 0.0152).27
26The result for relative contributions is particularly intriguing for the following reason:
given sanctions are directed predominantly from high- to low-contributors, we would ex-
pect an increased fraction of positive reactions after punishment even for a player choosing
her contributions randomly from any symmetric distribution over the range of possible con-
tribution choices. Only players who always contribute a constant fraction of their wealth
(which we do not observe) or players responding negatively to received punishment would
not increase their relative contributions. On the other hand, players not being punished
tend to be those with higher contributions. An increase in their relative contribution level
would be expected to be less likely.
27This, however, can be due to two diﬀerent reasons: (i) subjects may think in terms
of relative contributions, thus increasing their relative contributions after being subject to
sanctions. (ii) They focus on the absolute contribution level (as well), with a tendency to
keep it constant; in this case, punishment need not inﬂuence contribution behavior but
leads to an increase in relative contributions merely by reducing contribution capabilities.
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To further explore this positive eﬀect of punishment on relative contributions
and ﬁnd out how other factors pertaining to social comparisons inﬂuence
contribution decisions, we conduct the regression analysis reported in Table
2.28 We contrast the results from this regression analysis to those from a
similar analysis conducted on the data from our dynNOpun treatment in
order to ﬁnd out how the introduction of a punishment mechanism changes
the data-generating process.
In the ﬁrst model reported in table 2, we regress a player's period-to-
period change in relative contributions on a number of lagged variables,
namely the deviation of her relative contribution from the other group mem-
bers' average contribution to test whether players condition their behavior
on others' decisions; her contribution capability's deviation from the others'
average capability to account for players' historical relative wealth levels
within their society; and the deviation of the player's surplus from the pub-
lic good from the others' average surplus; furthermore, a dummy variable
indicating whether the player had been sanctioned in the preceding round,
as well as the fraction of the player's current (i.e., interim) wealth destroyed
by others' assignments. All mentioned deviations are normalized using the
average (except for the comparisons of relative contributions), and split into
two positive variables to allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of above- and below-
average values. Finally, we include the variation coeﬃcient of players' cur-
rent contribution capabilities to control for heterogeneity within the group,
the logarithm of the average capability to account for the current group level
of prosperity, and the period to allow for potential time trends. In the sec-
ond model, we use the same framework on the data from our dynNOpun
treatment, naturally excluding all variables pertaining to punishment.
A ﬁnding that is common to both data sets is that negative deviations
from the average surplus from the public good lead to signiﬁcantly lower con-
tributions in the following round. What this means is that high-contributors
show particularly negative reactions to wealthy free-riders, that is, to free-
riders with a history of defecting. At the same time, having a history of
28Only data from periods 1 to 19 is included, to keep our data as clean as possible from
endgame eﬀects. Signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: ∗∗∗0.001,∗∗ 0.01,∗ 0.05.
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Table 2: Results from a linear GLS regression of period-to-period changes
in relative contributions, with individual random-eﬀects and errors clustered
by groups.28
Variable dynPUN dynNOpun
Positive deviation from the average relative
contribution in t− 1
-0.1731
(0.1104)
-0.1809∗
(0.0846)
Negative deviation from the average relative
contribution in t− 1
-0.0037
(0.0765)
0.2157
(0.1497)
Positive deviation from the average capability
in t− 1, normalized‡
-0.0172
(0.0151)
-0.0182
(0.0279)
Negative deviation from the average capability
in t− 1, normalized‡
0.0807
(0.0747)
0.1835∗∗∗
(0.0452)
Positive deviation from the average surplus
from the public good in t− 1, normalized‡
0.0087
(0.0075)
0.0036
(0.0068)
Negative deviation from the average surplus
from the public good in t− 1, normalized‡
-0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0162)
-0.0699∗
(0.0313)
Dummy: having been punished in t− 1 0.0011
(0.0131)
Received punishment as a fraction of the cur-
rent wealth level in t− 1
0.2009∗∗
(0.0612)
Variation coeﬃcient of the group's current
contribution capabilities
-0.0023
(0.0221)
-0.0862∗∗∗
(0.0228)
Period -0.0013 0.0021
(0.0011) (0.0019)
Logarithm of the group's average contribution
capability
0.0094∗
(0.0039)
-0.0056
(0.0071)
Constant -0.0206 0.0071
(0.0171) (0.0240)
‡
Deviations are normalized by division by the average contribution capability and
average surplus, respectively.
being a high-contributor in dynNOpun,  as evidenced by a comparatively
low lagged contribution capability  tends to lead to higher contributed frac-
tions of wealth, similar to the results of Sadrieh and Verbon (2006). However,
this eﬀect is being compensated by another eﬀect found in this treatment,
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namely that having contributed a higher fraction of one's wealth than the
other group members in the preceding period leads to a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion of relative contributions. In other words, in this treatment players are
eager to adjust contribution levels downwards when they learn that their
relative contribution had been comparatively high  unless they are uncon-
ditional high-contributors, in which case relative contributions will tend to
remain constant. With punishment being possible in dynPUN, contribution
capabilities do not perform as an indicator for past contribution behavior
in the same way as they do in dynNOpun. This may be a possible reason
for why we do not see comparable eﬀects in the regression on our dynPUN
data, as not being able to separate between high-contributor types and spo-
radic high-contributors will drive up the variance of observed behavior (as
can be seen from the higher standard errors of the respective dynPUN coef-
ﬁcients, compared to those from the dynNOpun treatment). In terms of the
level of prosperity within our small societies as measured by the logarithm
of the group's average current contribution capability, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
contribution-fostering eﬀect only in dynPUN. This eﬀect seems to be owed
to the fact that in the better-performing groups in this treatment, play-
ers' relative contribution levels exhibit a converging tendency. Given this
convergence is towards higher contribution levels, and in light of the fact
that it happens while the corresponding groups accumulate growing prosper-
ity levels, growing capabilities will be associated with positive contribution
changes. In light of this fact, the signiﬁcance of the reported eﬀect is not
surprising. On the other hand, taking a look at individual group data we see
that in the non-punishment groups, the attempts to induce a high level of
group cooperation on the part of unconditional high-contributors by setting
a good example are successful only to the degree that relative contribution
levels in the respective groups tend to remain constant rather than decline
as they do in other groups.29 At the same time, long-term contributors tend
to lower their contributions towards the end of the experiment, having seen
their hopes of reciprocation dashed.
29For an overview of the data, cf. the panel ﬁgures C.1 and C.2 included in appendix
C.
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In contrast, an increase in the gap between poor and rich leads to less
cooperative behavior only in the treatment without punishment opportu-
nities. An additional regression reported in appendix C that incorporates
an interaction term between the period and heterogeneity of contribution
capabilities suggests an explanation for the non-eﬀect in dynPUN. In the
beginning, a higher level of endogeneity has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence
on contributions, as it means that there is a fraction of players willing to
keep investing in the public good even though others have not met the same
cooperation standards straight away. In these groups, as was pointed out
before, players with lower cooperation levels tend to increase their contribu-
tions. In essence, this means that in general, players tend to increase their
contributions in groups with high initial degrees of heterogeneity. Over time,
however, this trend is reverted: in the second half, heterogeneity leads to a
decrease in the contribution level. This seems to suggest that groups have
separated themselves: in some groups, contribution levels have converged,
leading to a low degree of heterogeneity, in others, early-investors' patience
is exhausted. In summary, the presence of the punishment mechanism seems
to prolong the early-investors' patience, as the interaction term's coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant in the corresponding analysis on the dynNOpun data and
the term for wealth heterogeneity remains clearly below zero.30 This reading
would suggest that the punishment opportunities provide an avenue to vent
one's anger as has been documented, e.g., by Dominique J.-F. de Quervain
et al. (2004). At the same time, the detrimental eﬀect of heterogeneity in
dynNOpun is in line with the results of earlier studies of endowment hetero-
geneity such as Anderson et. al (2007) or Cherry et al. (2005).
Finally, in terms of punishment our regression analysis (cf. Table 2) is
able to give a more complete picture than the Wilcoxon tests reported above.
While the analysis conﬁrms that the dichotomous variable of `having been
punished' does not have an eﬀect on relative contributions, we are able to
say more about the eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of severity of punishment.31 By
30More precisely, the term almost doubles, at the same time becoming insigniﬁcant; the
remaining coeﬃcients of this regression analysis are similar in size and signiﬁcance level
to those for the reported regressions, not conveying any new meaningful information.
31In an unreported regression, we substitute three dummies corresponding to the poten-
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controlling for players' contribution capability, we see that punishment does
more than simply to increase relative contributions through its capability-
decreasing nature. Furthermore, the size of the eﬀect suggests that, for strong
free-riders in otherwise high-contributing groups, punishment may lead to an
increase in contributions even in absolute terms.
5 Discussion and Implications
In our paper, we set out to extend the existing body of research on behav-
ior in social-dilemma situations in an important direction. In a public-good
game we introduce dynamics by letting a player's contribution capabilities
depend on that player's and her group's past behavior. This was done to
reﬂect a feature of many everyday dilemmas, namely that tomorrow's con-
tribution capabilities may depend on today's decisions. In this environment,
we examine the eﬀects of a punishment technology to explore whether pun-
ishment has the same contribution-enhancing eﬀect as in the static setting
even though the preconditions seem to be worse.
Our dynamics give rise to three critical issues: (i) punishment in early
rounds may have a lasting detrimental eﬀect on contribution
capabilities (H1), (ii) potential punishers anticipating this may abstain from
sanctioning, making the punishment institution pointless (H2), and (iii) with
growing wealth levels and a convex punishment technology, the institution
may lose its contribution-enforcing power over time, leading to stagnating
contributions in later periods (H1). Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd that
punishment, being particularly strong in early rounds does have a detrimen-
tal eﬀect on contribution capabilities (Result 4), as subjects do not abstain
from sanctioning. To the contrary, compared to a study of peer-punishment
mechanisms comprising similar cost-to-sanction rates as the punishment tech-
nology employed in our experiment, the average number of punishers is sur-
tial numbers of other group members assigning punishment points to the respective player
for the dichotomous variable of having been punished. The results do not diﬀer from
those reported above, in particular, none of the coeﬃcients corresponding to the number
of punishers turns out to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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prisingly high (Result 5). On the other hand, the average number of points
assigned per punishment action is relatively low. In light of the convexity of
our punishment cost function, splitting the burden of sanctioning costs is a
very sensible thing to do, as it saves resources on the punishers' side without
changing the threat potential with respect to free-riders. At the same time,
the loss in contribution capabilities is oﬀset by the punishment mechanism's
ability to keep the contributed fraction of players' current wealth levels con-
stant (Result 3). As a result, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in the contribu-
tion levels across treatments during the course of our experiment (Result 2).
Corresponding to the combined eﬀect of a divergence in relative contribution
levels and the diminishing trend of surplus destroyed due to punishment in
the dynPUN groups, we observe increasing growth rates in the punishment
environment, contrasting with falling rates in dynNOpun. At the end of our
experiment, wealth levels in dynPUN have caught up with those in the treat-
ment without punishment opportunities. In fact, they are already higher,
even though this diﬀerence is not large enough to yield a statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence (Result 1). Nonetheless, with non-distinguishable wealth
levels, substantially higher relative contributions and decreasing fractions of
public-good surplus destroyed through punishment, it seems merely a ques-
tion of time when the diﬀerence in contributions and, subsequently, wealth
levels is strong enough to be statistically discernible.
Having seen the eﬀects of a punishment mechanism on the aggregate level,
we set out to ﬁnd out more about the mechanisms at work on the individual
level, apart from the straightforward eﬀect of lowering individuals' contri-
bution capabilities. In terms of direct eﬀects, a regression analysis reveals
that punished players' reactions are independent of the number of sanction-
ing players, only depending on their total size. Furthermore, it shows that
the increase in relative contributions is more than just a consequence of re-
duced capabilities coupled with a ﬁxed level of contributions. In other words,
punishment does have a contribution-enhancing eﬀect that goes beyond pure
embellishment.
Looking at the punishers themselves, the assignment of sanctions seems
to have a second positive eﬀect. It seems to prolong high-contributors' pa-
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tience with their peers, giving them more time to reciprocate. While in the
dynNOpun treatment, such patience seems to be limited to a rather small
number of unconditional high-contributors, players with a punishment pos-
sibility are not as eager to correct their cooperation levels downwards when
learning that their contribution level was above the group average. Being
given the chance to sanction low-contributors, they have another way to dis-
play their anger than to reduce their contributions straight away. This leads
to the reported higher relative contributions and ﬁnds its expression in the
fact that a higher variance in wealth levels does not automatically lead to
lower contribution levels, thereby qualifying the earlier results of studies like
Anderson et al. (2007) or Cherry et al. (2005).
We have embarked on this inquiry into the eﬀects of a punishment mech-
anism in a dynamic public-good game in which players' contribution capa-
bilities are endogenously determined by their behavior in preceding rounds
by spanning a range of possible outcomes. On the one extreme, our bench-
mark scenario H1 postulated the level of punishment would be so high that
endowments could shrink over time and contributions would be lower than
in the treatment without punishment in spite of signiﬁcantly higher rela-
tive contribution levels. On the other, scenario H2 postulated we would not
observe punishment, as potential punishers would be too concerned about
maintaining future contribution capabilities.
Our main results lie in between, suggesting a beneﬁcial eﬀect of punish-
ment if the time horizon is long enough. Does this mean our scenarios were
completely unjustiﬁed? The answer is no. While we do not observe any
group in which wealth levels actually decrease  abstracting from the occa-
sional period  there was one group in dynPUN in which all individual relative
contributions are well above the median (and average) relative contribution
from the dynNOpun treatment for most of the time  and yet, this group's
wealth levels stay as low as in the second-worst performing dynNOpun group.
On the other extreme, we have a group in which punishment was virtually
never used before the kicking in of the end-game eﬀect in round 19.32 This
32As a matter of fact, there was a single assignment of 1 punishment point in period
16. In the ﬁnal two periods, there where 2 (4) assignments, destroying 34 (50) out of 1216
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group's performance corresponds to the median group from the treatment
without punishment opportunities.
Summing up, we observe that punishment enhances cooperation even in a
dynamic setting, and even for a convex technology that makes the destruction
of a given wealth fraction more and more costly, the more wealth levels
grow over the course of our experiment. In this sense, our results are a
reassuring sign of robustness for public-good studies on punishment. At the
same time, they underline the fact that peer-punishment will not be a suitable
solution of social dilemmas for all groups: in a dynamic setting, its double-
edged character clearly asserts itself: in some instances, the enhancement of
cooperation comes at too high a price, leading the respective society to end
up worse than it might have in the absence of sanctioning opportunities.
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A Instructions to the experiment
General information
• This experiment consists of 20 rounds with 2 stages each.
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to one of the
groups of four participants each. During the whole experiment, you
will interact only with the members of your group. However, at no
time, you will be informed about the identities of your group.
• You will be assigned an identity letter: R, S, T, or U that will be
kept constant during the whole experiment.
• At the beginning of the experiment, 18 experimental tokens, (your
starting endowment), will be assigned to your experimental (wealth)
account. Additionally, in each round you will receive a round endow-
ment of 2 tokens. Hence, your wealth account in the very ﬁrst
round consists of the starting endowment of 18 tokens and the round
endowment of 2 tokens, i.e., 20 tokens in total. In each of the follow-
ing rounds, your wealth account will be equal to your wealth account
that you reach at the end of the previous round plus the actual round
endowment of 2 tokens.
Course of Action
Stage 1: Contributing to the Project. In stage 1 of each round, you
have to decide how many tokens from your wealth account you are going to
contribute to the project. The remaining tokens will be kept by you. You
can only contribute integer number of tokens. The earnings from the project
are calculated according to the same formula for each group member. Please
note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e.,
each group member beneﬁts from all contributions to the project.
Your wealth after Stage 1
Your wealth after Stage 1 consists of two parts:
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Thus, your wealth account after Stage 1 amounts to:
Your wealth at the beginning of Stage 1  your contribution to the project
+ 1.6 ∗ sum of the contributions of all group members / 4
• tokens you have kept = your wealth at the beginning  your contribu-
tion to the project
• earnings from the project = 1.6 ∗ sum of the contributions of all group
members / number of group members
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Some examples for the calculation of your wealth after Stage 1
Your wealth account 20 32 63 15
Your contribution to the
project
7 17 52 3
Sum of the contributions of
other group members
25 21 18 37
Your earnings from the project
51.2 / 4
= 12.8
60.8 / 4
= 15.2
112 / 4
= 28.0
64 / 4
= 16.0
You kept from your wealth
account
20  7
= 13.0
32  17
= 15.0
63  52
= 11.0
15  3
= 12.0
Your wealth at the end of
Stage 1
25.8 30.2 39.0 28.0
Stage 2: Possibility of reduction. In stage 2 you will be informed (sorted
by identity letters) how much each group member contributed to the project
and how much her current wealth is. You have to decide whether you assign
tokens to other group members. You can assign tokens to each of your group
members. Each negative token you assign to a group member reduces her
wealth payoﬀ by 1 token. If you assign no tokens to a group member her
wealth won't change. Your costs for the assignment of tokens depend on the
number of tokens you assign, as depicted in the following table:
You can also assign tokens greater than depicted in the table, i.e., 76, 77,
etc. You can calculate your assignment costs for tokens greater than 75 by
entering the desired token number on Stage 2 in the respective cell on the
computer screen and press the button calculate my costs.
Limitations: You can only assign tokens, if you are able to pay the assign-
ment costs from your wealth account. You cannot reduce the earnings of
other group members not more than to zero. If you assign tokens more than
it would be suﬃcient to reduce the earnings of the target group member to
zero, you nevertheless have to pay for the whole reduction. The earnings of
the target member are reduced only to zero though. If you assign tokens to
others and receive some tokens from other group members simultaneously,
under certain circumstances your wealth account may get negative. You may,
however, balance this negative account over the rounds.
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Tokens
you
assign to
a group
member
Your as-
signment
costs
Tokens
you
assign to
a group
member
Your as-
signment
costs
Tokens
you
assign to
a group
member
Your as-
signment
costs
1 0.33 26 17.45 51 83.33
2 0.67 27 18.84 52 87.64
3 1.01 28 20.31 53 92.11
4 1.37 29 21.86 54 96.73
5 1.73 30 23.50 55 101.52
6 2.11 31 25.23 56 106.47
7 2.50 32 27.05 57 111.60
8 2.92 33 28.97 58 116.89
9 3.36 34 30.99 59 122.36
10 3.83 35 33.10 60 128.00
11 4.33 36 35.33 61 133.82
12 4.86 37 37.66 62 139.83
13 5.43 38 40.10 63 146.02
14 6.04 39 42.66 64 152.41
15 6.69 40 45.33 65 158.98
16 7.38 41 48.13 66 165.75
17 8.12 42 51.04 67 172.71
18 8.92 43 54.09 68 179.88
19 9.76 44 57.26 69 187.25
20 10.67 45 60.56 70 194.83
21 11.63 46 64.00 71 202.62
22 12.66 47 67.58 72 210.62
23 13.75 48 71.30 73 218.84
24 14.91 49 75.16 74 227.28
25 16.15 50 79.17 75 235.94
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Please note: The costs for the assignment of tokens to diﬀerent group
members are calculated separately. For example: If you assign 25 tokens to
each of the three members, your costs amount to 3 x 16.15 = 48.45 and not
235.94, which gives the costs of assignment if you assign 75 tokens to one
single group member.
Your wealth at the end of the round
Your wealth at the end of the round consists of the following parts:
• your wealth account after Stage 1
• minus your costs of assignment for the tokens you assigned
• minus the reductions caused by the tokens assigned by other group
members to you
Hence, in total:
Your wealth after Stage 2 (Your wealth at the end of the round) =
Your wealth account after Stage 1
 minus your costs of assignment for the tokens you assigned
 minus reductions caused by the tokens assigned by other group members
to you
Information
At the end of each round you will be informed about
• the wealth accounts of all members of your group
• the contributions of all your group members,
• the wealth accounts of all group members after Stage 1
• the tokens each group member received from other members (but you
will not know who assigned these tokens) and
• the wealth accounts of all group members after Stage 2
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After the feedback, the next round begins.
At the end of the experiment your wealth account will be transformed
into Euros according to the following formula: Your earnings in Euro = (Your
wealth in tokens)2/7
Hence, your cash earnings will lie between 0,00 Euros and 40,00 Euros.
You have now a couple of minutes of time to go over again the instructions.
If you should have some questions, please do not hesitate to inform us by
raising your hand. In this case we will come in to your cabin to clarify the
question. Please note that any kind of communication with other participants
is prohibited.
We wish you success!
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B Proof of existence of the equilibrium pro-
posed for the dynNOpun game (intended
for online publication only)
Consider a group of n players, interacting over T rounds in the dynNOpun
game as presented in the main part of the paper. In this appendix, we set
out to show that under relatively mild conditions, there is a class of equi-
libria with positive contribution levels if there are ν conditional cooperators,
with ν = min{j ∈ N|j > (1 − µ)/µ}, and k money-maximizing players,
k = n − ν, where conditional cooperators and money-maximizers are de-
ﬁned as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In fact, these equilibria may exist even
for k/(n − 1) > µ/2, in which case Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have shown
that in the standard non-repeated linear public-good game, no equilibrium
with positive contributions exists despite the presence of players with social
preferences.
In these equilibria, all money-maximizers choose a symmetric contribu-
tion xtmm, up to an arbitrary round T − t′, and zero-contributions ever after.
On the equilibrium path, the ν conditional cooperators always mirror the
money-maximizers' behavior from the respective preceding round. The equi-
librium yielding the highest  and symmetric  payoﬀs for all players is given
by t′ = 1 and xtmm = E
t
mm, ∀t ≤ T − t′, where Etmm is the money-maximizers'
round-t contribution capability. By a similar reﬁnement argument as em-
ployed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we shall focus our attention on this
particular equilibrium in the following.
Before we formulate our main proposition, we will introduce lemma 1
that will be helpful in our proof of the proposition.
Lemma 1. If a conditionally cooperative player i is the single wealthiest
player in her group, she will choose to equalize payoﬀs with the next-wealthiest
player (independent of whether this is a single player or a group), provided
her coeﬃcient for disadvantageous inequality, βi, fulﬁlls
βi <
n− 1
n− 3(1− µ). (2)
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Proof. It does not pay for the conditional cooperator to contribute less than
necessary to equalize payoﬀs with the next-wealthiest player, as any token
contributed to the public good makes her lose (1 − µ) in monetary terms,
but gains her βi/(n− 1) utility units for each player who is less wealthy than
herself. Given she is the wealthiest person in the group, her total gains are
βi units for each token contributed. By deﬁnition, a player is a conditional
cooperator if and only if β+µ > 1 holds.33 To contribute more than would be
necessary to equalize payoﬀs with a group of n′ next-wealthiest players, with
1 ≤ n′ ≤ n−1, her additional monetary loss from contributing an additional
token, (1 − µ), plus her utility loss from disadvantageous inequality vis-à-
vis the n′ formerly next-wealthiest players, n′αi/(n − 1), would have to be
less than her utility gains from advantageous inequality with respect to the
remaining players in the group, (n−1−n
′)βi
n−1 . We require that this is not the
case. Clearly, this requirement is strongest for n′ = 1. Simple calculus shows
that this requirement holds as long as
(1− µ)(n− 1) > (n− 2)βi − αi. (3)
However, given the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) speciﬁes βi ≤ αi, it is
obvious that inequality (2) is suﬃcient for (3) to hold.
Note that in our experiment, n = 4 and µ = 0.4. Thus, inequality (2)
reads as βi < 1.8. By construction of the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
βi ≤ 1. Therefore, the requirement (2) obviously will be met for any player
conforming to the model.
Proposition 1. Let a group of n members consist of ν conditional co-
operators and k money-maximizing players, where ν = min{j ∈ N|j >
(1 − µ)/µ} and k = n − ν. Then, the following conditions are suﬃcient
(yet not necessary) for positive-contribution equilibria to exist:
(I) k ≥ (n− 1)µ/(1− µ),
(II) µ ≥ 1/(n− 1), and
33Cf. Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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(III) βi <
n−1
n−3(1− µ) for all ν conditional cooperators.
In these equilibria, a conditionally cooperative player does not contribute if
there is a player wealthier than herself, nor if all players have the same
wealth levels. If there are players who are less wealthy than the conditional
cooperator, she chooses her contributions such as to equalize wealth levels
with the wealthiest money-maximizing player if that player did not contribute
a positive amount, or with the next-wealthiest conditional cooperator having
a diﬀerent wealth level than herself, whoever of the two is wealthier.
The k money-maximizers always contribute fully to the public good in
periods 1 to T − 1, as long as all ν conditional cooperators stick to their
equilibrium strategy. Otherwise, the money maximizers stop contributing.
This gives rise to the following behavior on the equilibrium path: all k
money-maximizers always contribute fully to the public good in periods 1
to T − 1, while the conditionally cooperative players always contribute the
amount necessary to equalize wealth levels in case the money-maximizing
players failed to contribute in the current round. This amount is exactly the
amount contributed by the money-maximizing player in the preceding round.
In other words, if all k money-maximizers are endowed with a given wealth
level Etk and all conditional cooperators had a level of E
t
ν on their accounts
in any given round t, t ≤ T − 1, then the former (latter) would contribute
xtk = E
t
k (x
t
ν = E
t
ν−Etk = Et−1k ; note that Etν > Etk must hold for the latter to
contribute a positive amount, which is fulﬁlled in the proposed equilibrium).
In the ﬁnal round, money maximizers do not contribute, and conditional
cooperators contribute as to equalize payoﬀs over all players.
Proof. First of all, consider a money-maximizing player j. Obviously, in
the ﬁnal round this player does not have an incentive to deviate from her
equilibrium strategy, as the ﬁnal round is equivalent to a one-shot linear
public-good game and in this class of games, free-riding is a dominant strat-
egy. Next, we show that a money-maximizing player j does not have an
incentive to deviate from her equilibrium strategy in round T − 1. Given
their equilibrium strategy, all ν conditionally cooperative players will choose
to contribute in round T any amount contributed by the least-contributing
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money-maximizer in round T − 1, as this leads to an equalization of payoﬀs
with the latter. At the same time, all money-maximizing players other than
j will choose to contribute everything on their current account. If j chooses
to deviate, she will therefore determine conditional cooperators' choices in
round T . Therefore, contributing in T − 1 will pay oﬀ if and only if the gain
from reducing her contribution by a single token, (1−µ), is smaller than the
gains from conditional cooperators' subsequent matching contributions, νµ.
This condition is equivalent to ν > (1−µ)/µ, which is true by the deﬁnition
of ν in proposition 1. In fact, this argument holds for any round t, given the
least-contributing money-maximizer's contributions are always matched by
conditional cooperators in t+ 1.
Now, consider a conditionally cooperating player i. To answer the ques-
tion of whether she has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy,
we start with an analysis of the ﬁnal round. In round T , the proposed equi-
librium strategy leads to an equal distribution of wealth. If condition (III)
holds, we know by lemma 1 that no conditional cooperator has an incentive
unilaterally to provide less than the prescribed level, as she will maximize her
utility by contributing as much as necessary to equalize payoﬀs with respect
to the second-wealthiest individual. On the other hand, a conditional cooper-
ator does not have an incentive unilaterally to provide more than prescribed
by the equilibrium strategy, given this would leave the cooperator worse oﬀ
both in monetary terms and in terms of (disadvantageous) inequality.
What the preceding paragraphs have shown is that (i) money-maximizers
do not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy prescribed by proposi-
tion 1 throughout the game, and (ii) conditional cooperators do not have an
incentive to deviate from their prescribed strategy in round T . What remains
to be shown is that the latter do not have an incentive to deviate in earlier
rounds. First of all, consider a single conditional cooperator providing q to-
kens less than prescribed in round T−1. While this deviation will not change
the behavior of money-maximizing players given their round-T contributions
will be zero irrespective of what other players do, it will lead to defection
also on the part of the remaining players. In this situation, by lemma 1 the
deviating player's best response will be to provide q tokens in the ﬁnal round.
44
By doing so, the ﬁnal situation will be the same as the situation before the
ﬁnal round under equilibrium play. The diﬀerence between this situation and
the equilibrium outcome is that conditional cooperators are better oﬀ than
money-maximizers in monetary terms, namely by the latters' round-(T − 1)
contributions. This leads to a utility gain compared to the equilibrium of
(1 − νµ)x∗,T−1κ − kn−1βix∗,T−1κ , where x∗,T−1κ is a money-maximizer's equilib-
rium contribution in T − 1. For the strategy proﬁle proposed in proposition
1 to be an equilibrium, this term must not be positive, which is equivalent
to requiring
k
(n− 1) ≥
(1− νµ)
βi
, (4)
for all ν conditional cooperators. The lowest-possible βi is βi = 1 − µ, by
deﬁnition of a conditional cooperator. Substituting this into inequality (4),
we obtain
k ≥ (n− 1)1− νµ
1− µ .
This requirement will obviously be fulﬁlled for the parameter values used in
our experiment, given it corresponds to condition (I) from the proposition
under the smallest-possible value of ν, (1− µ)/µ.
The next question to be answered is whether a conditional cooperator
has an incentive to `under-provide' relative to her prescribed strategy in
an earlier round. In this case, she would deter further contributions from
both money-maximizers and conditional cooperators, herself only closing the
resulting wealth gap vis-à-vis the other cooperators. The resulting payoﬀs
correspond to the equilibrium current wealth levels of that round in case the
conditional cooperator had not deviated. In other words, by contributing
less than prescribed, a conditional cooperator can ﬁx the payoﬀ vector at
the equilibrium current wealth level of a given round. We know from the
above that the conditional cooperator prefers the equilibrium outcome to
the current wealth levels before the ﬁnal round. What we have to show
is that she also prefers the equilibrium outcome to the equilibrium current
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wealth levels at the end of any round t, t < T . We do this by showing that
she, in fact, always prefers equilibrium current wealth levels in t+ 1 to those
in t, t < T − 1 (recall that we have already shown this for t = T − 1).
Denote by Etm (E
t
c) the equilibrium contribution capabilities of a money-
maximizing (conditionally cooperative) player, and by Etm and E
t
c the cor-
responding capability vectors. Note that, in equilibrium, Etc = E
t
m + E
t−1
m
must hold. Given their prescribed strategies in rounds t < T − 1, all money-
maximizers will choose xtm = E
t
m, while the conditional cooperators will
choose xtc = x
t−1
m = E
t−1
m . The resulting end-of-round wealth levels will be
Et+1m = µkE
t
m + µνE
t−1
m and E
t+1
c = E
t+1
m +E
t
m. All we have to show now is
that a conditional cooperator i's utility from a payoﬀ vector Et = (Etm,E
t
c),
Ui(E
t) is smaller than her utility from the payoﬀ vector Et+1. This is equiv-
alent to requiring
Ui(E
t+1) = Et+1m + E
t
m − kn−1βiEtm > Etm + Et−1m − kn−1βiEt−1m = Ui(Et)
⇔ Et+1m − Et−1m − kn−1βi(Etm − Et−1m ) > 0,
which by Et+1m = µkE
t
m +µνE
t−1
m and, consequently, E
t
m = µkE
t−1
m +µνE
t−2
m
leads to
(µk)2Et−1m +µ
2kνEt−2m +µνE
t−1
m −Et−1m −
k
n− 1βi(µkE
t−1
m +µνE
t−2
m −Et−1m ) > 0.
(5)
Reorganizing (5) yields
k(µ− βi
n− 1)
(
µkEt−1m +µνE
t−2
m
)
+ (µν − 1)Et−1m +
k
n− 1βiE
t−1
m > 0. (6)
In the following, we show why inequality (6) will always be fulﬁlled under the
conditions speciﬁed in the proposition. Consider ﬁrst the sum of the second
and third terms on the left-hand side of the inequality. By deﬁnition of ν,
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µν − 1 ≥ −µ, and therefore,
(µν − 1)Et−1m +
k
n− 1βiE
t−1
m ≥ Et−1m
( kβi
n− 1 − µ
)
. (7)
Under condition (I) from the proposition, it can be easily seen that the
right-hand side of (7) will be larger or equal to zero even for the smallest-
possible βi a conditional cooperator can have, i.e. βi = 1 − µ. Let us
now turn to the ﬁrst term in (6). Obviously, this term will be positive
if µ − βi/(n − 1) > 0 for all possible values of βi. In constructing their
model, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduced the restriction that βi ≤ 1.
Substituting the maximum-possible value for βi, we directly obtain condition
(II) from the proposition. In other words, under the conditions speciﬁed in
proposition 1, the sum on the left-hand side of inequality (6) will always
be positive. Thus, a conditional cooperator will never have an incentive
to deviate contributing less than under the equilibrium strategy, thereby
inducing a payoﬀ vector that equals the equilibrium wealth-level vector of
any earlier round t, t < T . Note that in our derivations, we have used a
number of conservative approximations. Therefore, the true parameter space
for which the equilibrium exists, will be larger than our conditions suggest.
What remains to be shown is that no conditionally cooperating player has
an incentive to contribute more than speciﬁed by the equilibrium strategy
prescribed by proposition 1. We have already done so for the ﬁnal period.
Consider period T − 1. If a conditionally cooperating player contributes
more than prescribed in our proposition, this will not have any eﬀect on
money-maximizers' behaviour, given the latter will not contribute any posi-
tive amounts in the ﬁnal round independent of her choice. If the player con-
tributes to her full capacity, she is equally well oﬀ as any money-maximizer.
In the ﬁnal period, the remaining conditional cooperators will equalize wealth
levels, such that no inequality will arise. Furthermore, the resulting wealth
levels will be as high as in the equilibrium, such that the conditional cooper-
ator will be equally well oﬀ, given the only change is the point in time when
reciprocation happens. To see this, note that nothing out of the returns from
the `over-contributed' amount is used for contributions, as contributions are
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determined by the wealth diﬀerence between money-maximizers and condi-
tional cooperators. This diﬀerence, however, is not aﬀected by the deviating
player's contribution. While this means that the strategy prescribed by our
proposition is (at best) a weak best-response, this does not aﬀect the ex-
istence of the proposed equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the deviating
cooperator chooses less than her full capability, there are two possibilities.
If there are still more than one conditional cooperators left, they stop to
contribute by lemma 1, as the next-wealthy player will be one of their peers.
If only one conditional cooperator is left, she will choose to equalize wealth
levels with the deviating cooperator, evidently being next-wealthy player.
However, this will diminish her ﬁnal-period contribution. Consequently, the
ﬁnal payoﬀ allocation would leave the deviating player worse oﬀ in monetary
terms, at the same time inducing inequality. Clearly, following the equilib-
rium strategy gives the player a higher utility.
Finally, consider any period T−t′, t′ ≥ 2. If a conditional cooperator con-
tributes more than speciﬁed in proposition 1, an argument that is analogous
to the one presented in the preceding paragraph shows that the conditional
cooperator cannot induce a payoﬀ vector that leaves him better oﬀ than the
wealth-level vector that would result in equilibrium after period T − t′ + 1.
However, in our discussion of the case of `under-provision' on the part of
a conditional cooperator, we have seen two things: given all other players
follow their equilibrium strategy, a conditional cooperator can always induce
a payoﬀ vector that is equal to the equilibrium wealth-level vector after any
arbitrary period; and the cooperator will never do so, as doing so would never
leave him better oﬀ under the conditions speciﬁed in the proposition. There-
fore, a conditional cooperator cannot possibly reach a higher utility level
than in equilibrium by contributing more than speciﬁed in the equilibrium
strategy. Evidently, this holds for all rounds t, t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Remark: The threat of money-maximizing players stopping to con-
tribute in response to over-contributions by conditional cooperators is not
as incredible as it may seem at ﬁrst sight. The number of conditional coop-
erators in our equilibrium, ν, has been speciﬁed to be minimal with respect to
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the number of cooperators necessary to make contributions in a given period
t, t < T, pay oﬀ for money-maximizing players. If one of these cooperators
contributes fully in period t, the cooperator will no longer match the money-
maximizers' contributions in t+1. Given ν is `minimal' in the sense speciﬁed
above, the money-maximizer would be better oﬀ free-riding in t. Therefore,
for the equilibrium to exist, conditional cooperators must not destroy the
money-maximizers' incentives for cooperation stemming from the formers'
reciprocity by `over-contributing' early on.
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C Additional regression results, overview ﬁg-
ures for individual groups (intended for on-
line publication only)
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Figure C.1: Overview of the data from individual groups in the dynPUN
treatment.
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Figure C.2: Overview of the data from individual groups in the dynNOpun
treatment. The third column is, of course, superﬂuous. We included it for
easier comparison with the data from dynPUN.
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Table C.1: Regression for the models from Table 2, extended by an interaction
term for period and the endowment variation coeﬃcient.
†
Variable dynPUN dynNOpun
Positive deviation from the average relative
contribution in t− 1
-0.1732
(0.1199)
-0.1679.
(0.0934)
Negative deviation from the average relative
contribution in t− 1
-0.0071
(0.0901)
0.2415
(0.1743)
Positive deviation from the average capability
in t− 1, normalized‡
-0.0101
(0.0179)
-0.0251
(0.0372)
Negative deviation from the average capability
in t− 1, normalized‡
0.0863
(0.0747)
0.1798∗∗∗
(0.0454)
Positive deviation from the average surplus
from the public good in t− 1, normalized‡
0.0094
(0.0081)
0.0030
(0.0063)
Negative deviation from the average surplus
from the public good in t− 1, normalized‡
-0.0580∗∗∗
(0.0172)
-0.0710∗
(0.0309)
Dummy: having been punished in t− 1 0.0008
(0.0123)
Received punishment as a fraction of the cur-
rent wealth level in t− 1
0.1933∗∗
(0.0660)
Variation coeﬃcient of the group's current
contribution capabilities
0.1388∗
(0.0662)
-0.1584
(0.1163)
Period -0.0009 0.0014
(0.0016) (0.0016)
Period ∗ Variation coeﬃcient of the group's
current contribution capabilities
-0.0151∗
(0.0063)
0.0062
(0.0092)
Logarithm of the group's average contribution
capability
0.0095∗
(0.0046)
-0.0081
(0.0110)
Constant -0.0438∗ 0.0259
(0.0224) (0.0371)
†
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated as follows: ∗∗∗ 0.001, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗ 0.05, . 0.1.
‡
Deviations are normalized by division by the average contribution capability and average surplus, respectively.
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